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NOTE 
EXPANDING FORFEITURE WITHOUT 
SACRIFICING CONFRONTATION 
AFTER CRAWFORD 
Joshua Deahl* 
I love murder cases; you have one less witness to worry about. 
-Murray Richman, defense lawyer 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central holding of Crawford v. Washington2 is fairly straightforward: 
The Confrontation Clause3 bars the admission of out-of-court testimonial 
statements unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.4 Crawford, however, has an often overlooked caveat. In renouncing 
numerous exceptions to the confrontation right, the Court rejected only 
those that purport to test the reliability of testimonial statements. It left equi­
table exceptions undisturbed. As the Court pointed out, "[T]he rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation 
claims on essentially equitable grounds."5 
The parameters of the rule of forfeiture are a matter of some dispute. As 
opposed to a waiver, which requires a knowing and intelligent relinquish­
ment of a right, forfeiture occurs when an individual commits an act 
inconsistent with maintaining a right. 6 It has traditionally applied in witness­
tampering cases, where a defendant intimidates, bribes or kills a witness just 
before she is scheduled to testify. In those situations, forfeiture should bar 
the defendant from successfully objecting to the admission of the witness's 
prior unconfronted testimony. 
To illustrate, consider a defendant who is charged with running a large 
drug operation.7 The day the prosecution's key witness is to testify, he is 
killed on the way to the courthouse. Luckily for the prosecutor, the witness 
already gave testimony implicating the defendant before a grand jury, and 
the prosecutor now seeks to admit it in lieu of the witness's in-court testi­
mony. Let us assume that there is no question that the defendant played a 
role in killing the witness; he admits it. Nevertheless, he objects, "The Sixth 
Amendment grants me the right to confront this witness, and since I have 
not been afforded that right, this unconfronted testimony should be ex­
cluded." The rule of forfeiture prevents this objection from succeeding, 
since it was the defendant who caused the unavailability of the witness. As 
one authority explained, applying the rule of forfeiture effectively says to 
the defendant, "You have no valid complaint about the loss of a right that, as 
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3. The Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .  to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
4. As the Court noted, "Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: 
confrontation." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. Courts have focused on flushing out this rule, with 
particular attention paid to outlining exactly what constitutes a testimonial statement, as the Court 
explicitly left that issue unresolved. Id. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' "). 
5. Id. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878)). 
6. See Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional 
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1214 (1977). 
7. This fact pattern is modeled after United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 
1982). To be exact, evidence showed that Mastrangelo was involved in the importation of 23.4 tons 
of marijuana and 499,000 methaqualone tablets. Id. at 271. 
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a natural and desired result of your own conduct, it is impossible to afford 
you. ,,8 
Before Crawford, only when a defendant acted to silence a witness to a 
prior crime would courts apply forfeiture.9 The rule operated as a disincen­
tive to keep organized crime affiliates from "knocking off'' witnesses. 10 But 
as one judge succinctly put it, "Crawford heightens the importance of . . .  
the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing."11 In the brief period of time since 
Crawford was decided, a number of courts have extended the rule's reach to 
instances where the wrongdoing that makes a witness unavailable is identi­
cal to the defendant's alleged crime,12 while several courts have declined the 
invitation.13 The California Supreme Court recently granted review to an­
swer the question, "Does [forfeiture] apply where the alleged 'wrongdoing' 
is the same as the offense for which defendant was on trial?"14 This has been 
8. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of ChutlJJa, 31 IsR. L. REV. 506, 
518 (1997) [hereinafter Friedman, ChutlJJa]. A more common way of stating the principle, albeit 
slightly less pointed, is that "one not be permitted to profit from one's own wrongdoing." People v. 
Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (App. Div. 1996); see also 5 JOHN HENRY WJGMORE, EVIDENCE IN 
ThiALS AT COMMON LAW§ 1390 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974) ("Where . . .  the failure to 
obtain cross-examination is in any sense attributable to the cross-examiner's own consent or fault, 
the lack of cross-examination is of course no objection.") (emphasis in original). 
9. See James F. F lanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness 
Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REv. 459, 482 (2003) (surveying case law and concluding that forfeiture 
"has only been used when the defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying 
at trial"). 
10. Id. at 466-72 (describing the modem doctrine as arising with the Organized Crime Act 
of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, and the development of the Witness Protection Program). 
11. United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 916 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J. dissenting). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005). In Garcia-Mew, 
the Sixth Circuit noted: 
There is no requirement that a defendant who prevents a witness from testifying against him 
through his own wrongdoing only forfeits his right to confront the witness where, in procuring 
the witness's unavailability, he intended to prevent the witness from testifying. Though the 
Federal Rules of Evidence may contain such a requirement, see FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(6), the 
right secured by the Sixth Amendment does not depend on, in the recent words of the Supreme 
Court, "the vagaries of the Rules of Evidence." 
Id. at 370; People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2004); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004); 
Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App. 2004). A line of cases decided in California Courts of 
Appeal in the last year has shown this same willingness, prompting the California Supreme Court to 
review the questions arising from them. See People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Ct. App. 2004), 
review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. Dec. 22, 2004); People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Ct. App. 
2004), review granted, 103 P.3d 270 (Cal. Dec. 22, 2004); see also People v. Taylor, No. A095412, 
2005 WL715973 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2005); People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083 
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501 (D. Colo. 
Mar. 3, 2005); United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137-1, 2004 WL1631675 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 
2004); State v. Wiggins, No. 99 CRS 46567, 2005 WL 857109 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2005); 
State v. Ivy, No. W2003-00786-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL 3021146 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004). 
14. People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Dec. 
22, 2004). 
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referred to as applying forfeiture "reflexively," 15 and I will borrow the term 
throughout this Note. 
A reflexive application of forfeiture occurs whenever a defendant is 
charged with the very act that allegedly made the witness unavailable. Con­
sider a defendant (D) who is charged with murder. Just before death, the 
victim calmly told the police, "I would like to report that D inflicted this 
potentially fatal injury upon me."16 The prosecutor may then seek to admit 
this testimony at D's murder trial-although D has not had the chance to 
confront the victim--on the grounds that D forfeited his confrontation right 
by killing the victim. Post-Crawford courts have been somewhat receptive to 
this rather innovative application of forfeiture. 17 
This extension of the rule would understandably be an unwelcome de­
velopment for a number of jurists. One judge responded to suggestions that 
forfeiture ought to apply reflexively by saying, "It's almost frivolous to ar­
gue forfeiture in this case . . .. I wouldn't have given anybody five minutes 
to argue forfeiture."18 Nevertheless, it may have been exactly what the Su­
preme Court intended when it mentioned the rule of forfeiture in Crawford 
and described it as an equitable principle. 19 After all, the only brief that men­
tioned forfeiture explicitly advocated this reflexive application of it. 20 
This Note argues that forfeiture ought to apply reflexively and that there 
is no principled way to limit the doctrine-as pre-Crawford courts had-to 
witness-tampering cases. Forfeiture should apply whenever a defendant's 
wrongdoing caused a witness's unavailability. Extending forfeiture in this 
way could drastically alter the way certain crimes are prosecuted. Unavail-
15. See Friedman, Chut(JJa, supra note 8, at 508. 
1 6. The reason why I frame it as a calm police report is just to make clear that it would be 
testimonial under Crawford, the implications of which I describe in Part I. 
17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The most illustrative case is Meeks, 88 P.3d 
789. In that case, an officer rushed to the scene of a shooting, and asked the victim who shot him, to 
which the victim replied, "Meeks shot me." Id. at 792. The trial court admitted the statement prior to 
the ruling in Crawford under an evidentiary rule that was almost certainly inapplicable post­
Crawford. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the conviction, holding that the 
defendant had forfeited his confrontation right by killing the witness, despite the fact that his 
wrongdoing was not targeted at silencing a witness. 
18. This was the statement of Judge Avem Cohn of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, after judging a moot court round featuring an argument in favor of applying 
forfeiture in this way. His reactions to the argument, and the round which discussed forfeiture at 
some length, can be viewed at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-shawndel/campbell.htm (last vis­
ited July 24, 2005). This particular statement was made approximately one hour and twenty six 
minutes into the recording. 
19. Crawford v. Washington, 54 1 U.S 36, 62 (2004). 
20. See Amicus Curiae Brief, Law Professors Clark, et al., Crawford (No. 02-9410), avail­
able at 2003 WL 21754958 (July 24, 2003) [hereinafter Law Professors' Brief]. Addressing 
forfeiture, the brief argued: 
If the trial court determines as a threshold matter that the reason the victim cannot testify at 
trial is that the accused murdered her, then the accused should be deemed to have forfeited the 
confrontation right, even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the 
one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable. 
Id. at *24 n. 16 (citing Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 8). 
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able victims who were intimidated by the crimes against them, such as do­
mestic abuse victims, could have their prior unconfronted testimony 
admitted based on forfeiture findings. 
Beyond revisiting the arguments in favor of the reflexive application of 
forfeiture, this Note adds a new layer of analysis. It requires looking at a 
hybrid case. It is different from the two hypotheticals described above inso­
far as it includes both witness tampering and reflexive application of 
forfeiture. The case I have in mind involves a witness coming forward to the 
police and reporting, "D is engaged in a large drug operation, and he threat­
ened to kill me if I cooperated with the police." When the witness is 
subsequently killed, prosecutors seek to admit this statement against D, not 
in his trial for running the drug operation, but in his trial for murdering the 
witness. The reason for discussing this third type of case is that it requires 
the reflexive application of forfeiture-but even pre-Crawford courts were 
typically willing to apply forfeiture reflexively so long as it involved a fact 
pattern like this one. This suggests that courts are not opposed to applying 
forfeiture reflexively in any principled way. Instead, there is likely an alter­
native explanation that captures why courts are willing to apply forfeiture 
reflexively in witness-tampering cases but are reluctant to do so under other 
circumstances. 
Part I of this Note sets the stage by briefly reviewing Crawford and its 
implications for the rule of forfeiture. Part II argues that forfeiture ought to 
apply reflexively and that the reason why courts are reluctant to apply it as 
such is not because of a principled objection to it, but for an alternative, 
purely evidentiary reason. That is, evidence of forfeiture's occurrence is 
likely to be particularly strong in witness-tampering cases. Part III considers 
the potentially vast ramifications of applying forfeiture so expansively, as it 
threatens to extinguish the right to confront critical witnesses in a variety of 
cases. Part Ill, therefore, also suggests some principled limitations to the 
rule. I argue that two limitations-a narrow interpretation of witness un­
availability and a bar on bootstrapping testimonial evidence-should largely 
allay the concerns of jurists worried about the expansion of forfeiture. I con­
clude that while forfeiture should be substantially limited to protect the 
vitality of the Confrontation Clause, it should not be restricted to witness­
tampering cases. After rejecting this limitation, which has needlessly preoc­
cupied courts and commentators, we should expect more defensible 
constraints to develop. 
I. How CRAWFORD CALLS FOR A NEW APPROACH TO FORFEITURE 
While Crawford largely revamped and clarified Confrontation Clause 
analysis, it also called the scope of forfeiture into question. This may come 
as a surprise, since the language of Crawford appears to have done nothing 
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more than reaffirm the rule of forfeiture in passing. 21 It becomes necessary 
to review the changing face of the Confrontation Clause post-Crawford 
alongside the rule of forfeiture to understand how forfeiture is due for a 
makeover. 
Before Crawford, Ohio v. Roberts22 provided the predominant frame­
work for interpreting the Confrontation Clause. Under Roberts, the 
Confrontation Clause was concerned with all statements made by out-of­
court declarants.23 Noting, however, that confrontation was aimed at testing 
the reliability of these statements, a defendant's confrontation right could be 
satisfied if the witness was unavailable and the contested statement con­
tained "adequate 'indicia of reliability.' "24 These indicia were usually found 
within "firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]."25 For example, one firmly 
rooted hearsay exception is the dying declaration, which allows the admis­
sion of hearsay statements in homicide prosecutions if they are "made by a 
declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concern­
ing the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be 
impending death."26 The peculiar rationale for this exception is that "[n]o 
person who is immediately going into the presence of his Maker will do so 
with a lie upon his lips."27 
Crawford drastically altered this framework in two principal ways. First, 
it held that the Confrontation Clause concerns only testimonial statements.28 
While the parameters of what constitutes a testimonial statement were not 
precisely drawn, it is enough for our purposes to know that "(a]n accuser 
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a 
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
not."29 In other words, the Court gave substance to what it means to be a 
"witness against" somebody, such that Sixth Amendment protection applies 
only if the out-of-court declarant can fairly be described as bearing witness. 
21. To reiterate, the Court's only mention of the rule came when it said, "[T]he rule of forfei­
ture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds . . .  " 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
22. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
23. Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confronta-
tion Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JusT. 4, 5 (2004). 
24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
25. Id. 
26. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2). 
27. Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881). This rationale is 
strange, to say the least. I am reminded of a sketch by a comedy troupe, The Kids in the Hall, that 
somewhat captured the fallacy behind this explanation. After a defendant took the stand in his own 
defense and blatantly lied in response to every question, the prosecutor reminded him that he was 
under oath. In response, the defendant quipped, "Oh right. And I would never lie under oath-not to 
God." The Kids in the Hall: The Murder Trial (HBO television broadcast 1991), transcript available 
at http://www.kithfan.org/work/transcripts/three/suspicsn.html (last visited July 24, 2005). See also 
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 327-32 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, 
EVIDENCE) (providing a more in-depth discussion of the peculiarities of this exception). 
28. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-53 (2004). 
29. Id. at 51. 
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Second, once it is determined that a statement is testimonial, a judicial find­
ing that the statement is reliable will not satisfy a defendant's confrontation 
right.3° Confrontation is the constitutionally prescribed procedure for testing 
the reliability of testimony, and there can be no substitute for that method, 
even when a witness becomes unavailable. Crawford narrowed the scope of 
the Confrontation Clause, applying it only to testimonial statements; it also 
strengthened it, renouncing exceptions to the rule that purported to be surro­
gate tests for reliability. The Confrontation Clause is now a "smaller mouth 
[with] bigger teeth."31 
But the rule after Crawford is not as clear cut as it appears to be. In not­
ing that confrontation is a constitutionally required check on the reliability 
of testimonial statements, the Court stated that it was renouncing only those 
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that purported to assess the reliabil­
ity of testimony.32 The Court noted that forfeiture remains a valid exception 
to the Confrontation Clause, as it is an equitable principle unconcerned with 
the reliability of the statements at issue.33 That is, when it is the defendant's 
own fault that she cannot confront a witness, she loses her confrontation 
right regardless of the testimony's reliability. The Court's reference to the 
rule of forfeiture is odd, if for no other reason than the Supreme Court has 
rarely mentioned it in its opinions. Despite dating back to the seventeenth 
centuq/4 and more recently being codified in the Federal Rules of Evi­
dence, 5 the rule of forfeiture had been mentioned in only one other 
Supreme Court opinion in the past seventy y ears.36 
The mention of forfeiture was more than a trivial passing reference. 
While prior exceptions to the inadmissibility of hearsay have been largely 
eviscerated when testimony is at issue, forfeiture remains intact because it is 
not a gauge for reliability. As a result, prosecutors eager to admit testimonial 
evidence have become rather innovative in arguing for an expansive 
30. Id. at 53-56. 
31. W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. 
Washington: Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (2005). 
32. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. Another example of such an exception is the "excited utter­
ance" exception to the rule against hearsay. See FED. R. Evm. 803(2) (1980). The justification for 
admitting such excited utterances is that "a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the 
capacity of reflection . . .  produces utterances free of conscious fabrication." FED. R. Evm. 803 
advisory committee's notes. Before Crawford, these hearsay exceptions applied indiscriminately to 
both testimonial and non-testimonial statements. Indeed, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, any 
statement-testimonial or otherwise--demonstrating "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness" was an exception from the rule against hearsay under certain conditions. FED. R. 
Evm. 807. 
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
34. See Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L. 1666). 
35. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6) (amended 1997). 
36. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-47 (1970). It was mentioned in five decisions 
prior to Allen. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Diaz v. United States, 223 
U.S. 442, 452-53 (1912); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472-74 (1900); Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878). 
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forfeiture 37-since they often have little other recourse in tryin� to admit 
unconfronted testimony-and courts have been pretty receptive. 3 Given the 
new approach to the Confrontation Clause, overlooking the emerging impor­
tance of forfeiture could be a serious mistake. 
The analysis here aims at exploring the outer reaches of the rule of for­
feiture, as confined by the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution. Even if 
the Constitution permits a finding of forfeiture, though, testimony may still 
be excluded under the Federal Rules of Evidence or under any given state's 
evidentiary code.39 A plain reading of the Federal Rules may restrict the ap­
plication of forfeiture reflexively, as it applies only when a defendant 
"intended to . . .  procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness," 
although this language is not entirely clear. 40 Thus, if a prosecutor success­
fully argues that a defendant can reflexively forfeit his confrontation right 
under the Constitution, she will still have to contend with the evidentiary 
rules, since they may provide broader protection for a defendant.41  Courts 
have specifically noted that the dimensions of forfeiture may be different in 
the Federal Rules and state codes of evidence than in the Constitution. 42 I 
will not explore the extent of these potential differences, as the analysis here 
targets the constitutional dimensions of forfeiture. 
JI. EXPANDING FORFEITURE BEYOND WITNESS-TAMPERING CASES 
There is an unnoticed trend in the forfeiture case law that should lead us 
to accept its expansion beyond witness-intimidation cases. This Part aims at 
37. See, e.g., Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May Be Blind, It ls Not Stupid": Applying 
Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR, Nov. -Dec. 2004, at 14. 
38. See supra notes 12-13; irifra Part II.A. 
39. In stressing the disjunction between the Rules of Evidence and the Constitution, the 
Court stated, "[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to 
leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence." Crawford v. Wash­
ington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also 4 DAVID w. LoUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE§ 4 18, at 123 ( 1980) ("Few tasks in criminal evidence are more perplexing than 
to describe the effect of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment upon the hearsay doc­
trine."). 
40. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6). While this could be read to limit forfeiture to witness­
intimidation cases, it is a matter for debate. Usually when somebody commits murder, we might 
accurately say that she intends to keep her victim from coming forward as a witness, even though 
we probably would not describe it that way. While surely that is not her only motivation-since she 
might just as easily do that by not committing the murder in the first place-most murderers cer­
tainly see the absence of their victims as an intended benefit. 
4 1. For a reading of the statutory history behind Rule 804(b)(6) that would lend support to 
interpreting it as only applying to witness-intimidation cases, see generally Leonard Birdsong, The 
Exclusion of Hearsay Through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing-Old Wine in a New Bottle-Solving the 
Mystery of the Codification of the Concept into Federal Rule 804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. REV. 891 
(200 1), and Flanagan, supra note 9. 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that the court 
"need not worry about any potential differences between the substantive forfeiture standards . . .  
under [the] two provisions " as the defendant had only raised the hearsay issue). For an in-depth 
discussion about how one state's code of evidence differs from the Federal Rules with regard to 
forfeiture, see State v. Henry, 820 A.2d 1076, 1085-91 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). 
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exploring that trend in the hopes of determining the proper scope of the rule 
along with some limitations. In Section II.A, I review three different scenar­
ios where forfeiture might apply and how courts have responded to that 
suggestion. The cases demonstrate that, while courts sometimes object to 
the reflexive application of forfeiture, it is actually well-accepted under the 
proper circumstances. Sometimes courts will only apply forfeiture if the 
defendant was motivated by a desire to procure a witness's unavailability, 
while in other cases they seem entirely unconcerned by the defendant's mo­
tive. Likewise, some courts appeal to maintaining a presumption of 
innocence in refusing to apply forfeiture reflexively, but that concern disap­
pears under certain fact patterns for no discernible reason. Therefore, in 
order to make sense of the cases, we will need an alternative explanation for 
when courts are reluctant to apply forfeiture. 
In Section 11.B, I argue that the explanation is that courts are really only 
concerned with two limiting principles: (1) that forfeiture should be applied 
in a relatively narrow set of cases, and (2) only upon strong evidence of its 
occurrence. Accepting these as basic precepts underlying forfeiture should 
allow us to develop a more coherent approach to the rule and put the cases 
in perspective. 
A. Three Applications of Forfeiture: Revealing a Trend 
Many courts are willing to apply forfeiture reflexively in some situa­
tions, but not in others, and a closer look reveals that there is no principled 
distinction between the situations that justifies this disparity. An illustration 
should help ground the analysis. Victim 1 (V1) has been fatally shot, but just 
before he dies, he finds a police officer and makes Statement 1, "D shot 
me." Having witnessed the shooting, Victim 2 (V2) goes to the police and 
gives Statement 2, "D threatened to kill me if I cooperate with the police," 
and Statement 3, "I saw D shoot V/' V2 is subsequently killed just before 
she is scheduled to testify at trial. Assuming that there is enough evidence 
for a judge to find that D committed both the killings as a preliminary mat­
ter, 43 there are three questions44 we should ask with regard to the 
constitutionality of applying forfeiture: 
43. This is an assumption that I will be making throughout the analysis in Part II, but one 
that should not ordinarily be taken for granted. Of course, that both victims implicated D in their 
murders-V, at least did so speculatively-does not mean that D is guilty. How much discretion 
judges should have to make these determinations and what safeguards we should have in place is the 
subject of Part III, infra. But for now, the assumption is that there is ample evidence for a predicate 
finding that D committed both killings. 
Most courts have held that a predicate finding of forfeiture should be made under a "prepon­
derance of the evidence " standard. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's notes for 1997 
amends. (listing cases that apply the preponderance test, and offering only one case that applied a 
clear and convincing standard). But see United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. Unit B 
1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence). 
44. Since there are three statements and two trials in the hypothetical, there are technically 
six potential ways forfeiture could apply. However, we need not consider the other three possible 
combinations, as they would be either redundant or uninteresting. Also, the more accurate-but Jess 
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l. Could (V/s) Statement 3 be admitted in D's trial for murdering V,? 
2. Could (V2's)Statement 2 be admitted in D's trial for murdering V2? 
3. Could (V, 's) Statement 1 be admitted in D's trial for murdering V,? 
Courts addressing the constitutionality of these questions have unani­
mously answered "yes" to Question 1, as the Supreme Court has explicitly 
authorized this application of forfeiture.45 Similarly, an overwhelming ma­
jority of courts have answered "yes" to Question 2, despite the fact that it 
requires reflexive application of forfeiture. This puts the numerous courts 
and commentators answering "no" to Question 3 in a predicament. They 
must either (1) object to reflexive application of forfeiture, putting them at 
odds with the vast majority of courts answering "yes" to Question 2, or (2) 
come up with some justification for applying forfeiture reflexively in sce­
nario 2 but not in scenario 3. Courts have been unable to do this because 
there is no principled explanation for this discrepancy. A closer look at the 
three questions should help demonstrate this. 
1. The Classic Case for Forfeiture 
The first question is the easiest to answer: Forfeiture will preclude D's 
objection to the admission ofV/s statement, "I saw D shoot VI'" at his trial for killing V 1• This has been settled as a constitutional matter for more than 
a century. In other words, where a defendant's wrongful actions prevent a 
witness to a prior crime from testifying, he has forfeited his right to confront 
that witness in his trial for the initial crime. 
The Supreme Court already settled this question in Reynolds v. United 
States.46 Reynolds was on trial for bigamy, and one witness against him-his 
second wife-previously testified about the bigamy offense in an earlier 
trial. When the court officer contacted Reynolds in an attempt to serve a 
subpoena upon his second wife, Reynolds would not divulge her location. 
Instead, he stated, "[T]hat will be for you to find out . .. .  She does not ap­
pe?.r in this case."47 The Court, finding that Reynolds had kept his wife from 
testifying, held that when a defendant "voluntarily keeps the witnesses 
away, he cannot insist on his [confrontation] privilege."48 Notably, the Court 
never undertook any consideration of Reynolds' purpose, apparently indif­
ferent to the motivations underlying his obstructionism. While the Supreme 
concise-form of the questions would be, "Does forfeiture preclude D's confrontation-based objec­
tion to the admission of Statement X in his trial for murdering V x ?" 
45. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 160. 
48. Id. at 158. A court addressing a case like this today would likely have no occasion to 
reach the issue of forfeiture, because it appears that Reynolds had a full opportunity to examine the 
witness at his prior trial for the same offense. Id.; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 
(2004) ("Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the 
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opponunity to cross­
examine ."(emphasis added)). 
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Court has not made much use of the doctrine,49 every Circuit to address the 
issue has recognized this application of forfeiture. 5 0  
As in Reynolds, the courts addressing similar scenarios give little to no 
attention to the defendant's underlying motives.5 1  Indeed, if one places much 
importance on them, the results are absurd. Assume D killed V 2 not to keep 
her from testifying about V1's murder, but solely to get revenge when he 
found out V 2 cooperated with the police in their investigation of him. How 
could that possibly count in D's favor when balancing the equities? To place 
any importance on this motive, a court would have to effectively say, "You 
would not be able to object to the admission of this testimony had you killed 
V 2 to keep her from testifying, but since you killed her only to get revenge, 
your objection is allowed and V/s testimony is precluded notwithstanding 
the fact that you killed her." A court clinging to this distinction could not be 
viewed as one concerned with equity, but only with a contrived formal limi­
tation. As the Sixth Circuit found, "[t]he Supreme Court's recent affirmation 
of the 'essentially equitable grounds' for the rule of forfeiture strongly sug­
gests that the rule's applicability does not hinge on the wrongdoer's 
motive."5 2  While some courts espouse such formal limitations in other con­
texts, none has done so in a case where the victim witnessed a prior crime, 
gave testimony about it, and was then precluded from testifying by the de­
fendant's wrongdoing.5 3  
Thus, we can safely answer "yes" to Question 1 without further consid­
eration of D's motives. 
2. Reflexive Application of Forfeiture in Witness-Tampering Cases 
Forfeiture should, and typically will, preclude D from successfully ob­
jecting to the admission of V/s statement, "D threatened to kill me if I 
cooperate with the police," at his trial for killing V2• If there were a princi­
pled objection to applying forfeiture reflexively, it would sound in this 
second type of case. However, while Question 2 is slightly more 
49. See supra note 36 (counting a total of six cases in which the doctrine was even men­
tioned). 
50. See FED. R. Evm. 804 advisory committee's notes to 1997 amend. ("Every circuit that 
has resolved the question has recognized the principle of forfeiture by misconduct, although the 
tests for determining whether there is a forfeiture have varied."); see, e.g., United States v. Aguiar, 
975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 
(10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-59 (8th Cir. 1976). 
51. See id. (citing five cases with similar fact patterns, none of which gave much considera­
tion to the defendant's motives in procuring the witness's absence). 
52. United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States 
v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 916 (6th Cir. June 21, 2005) (quoting this same language). 
53. At least one case, in dicta, stated that the defendant's motivation behind procuring a 
witness's absence could be of decisive importance, even in witness-intimidation cases. See, e.g., 
State v. Hinson, No. M2000-02762-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31202134, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Sept. 27, 2002) ("Even intentional misconduct, such as killing a witness, does not qualify unless 
done for the purpose of procuring the witness's unavailability. ") Notably, that court was not inter­
preting the constitutional limitations of forfeiture, but those under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. 
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controversial than the first, an overwhelming majority of courts have an­
swered its equivalent in the affirmative.54 
The question posed is whether V/s statement, "D threatened to kill me if 
I cooperate with the police," is admissible in D's trial for killing V2 on the 
grounds that D forfeited his right to confront her. While the question might 
seem far-fetched, there is no shortage of cases posing nearly identical sce­
narios. For instance, a similar fact pattern arose in United States v. Dhinsa.55 
In that case, after Manmohan Singh provided the police with information 
regarding numerous crimes Gurmeet Dhinsa had committed, he further 
stated that he was afraid that Dhinsa would kill him-and had threatened to 
do so--for cooperating with the police. After Singh was killed, his state­
ments that Dhinsa had threatened to kill him were admitted in Dhinsa's trial 
for Singh's murder.56 The Second Circuit, agreeing with the majority of 
courts addressing similar scenarios, found no problem with applying forfei­
ture under these circumstances.57 
This question is both similar and different to Question 1 in important 
ways. It is similar insofar as it involves tampering with a witness to a prior 
crime. V2 had witnessed D's slaying of V1 and made testimonial statements 
about it before D killed him. And for the same reasons stated above, it 
would be misguided for a court to become preoccupied with D's motives for 
slaying Vi- But it is different from the scenario in Question 1, since D is 
now on trial for the same wrongdoing that caused the forfeiture of his right 
to confront Vi- In this case, the court's forfeiture finding depends on deter­
mining that D murdered V 2 as a predicate matter, and then the court must try 
D for the same murder of V 2• 
That there are two identical issues to be decided-first as a predicate 
matter and then at trial--does raise concerns. One court recently articulated 
the typical objections: 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying forfeiture re­
flexively in a murder trial when the victim had contacted the police about some of defendant's 
illegal activities and defendant subsequently ordered him killed after learning about it); United 
States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the defendant's objection that forfeiture 
should only apply for "the underlying crimes about which he feared [his victim] would testify, not in 
a trial for murdering her."); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); United 
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278-81 (!st Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 
983, 993-95 (I I th Cir. 1985) (finding that forfeiture applied in a defendant's murder case, where he 
committed the murder upon finding out that his victim was an undercover informant); United States 
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627-33 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (admitting murder victim's prior testimony 
when one of the three charges against the defendant was the murder of that victim). But see United 
States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426--27 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting the reflexive application of 
forfeiture even though the government argued that the murder in question was done in order to pro­
cure the witness's unavailability in a divorce proceeding). 
55. 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001). 
56. In one of his appellate briefs-<:oauthored by Alan M. Dershowitz-Dhinsa argued that 
this was the most important evidence against him regarding Manmohan Singh's murder. Reply Brief 
of Defendant-Appellant Gurmeet Singh Dhinsa at 9, Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (No. 99-1682) ("The 
most important . . .  evidence was testimony by Manmohan's emotional, grieving father that Man­
mohan said that [Dhinsa] had threatened to kill him-evidence used by the government as evidence 
that the defendant did have Manmohan killed."). 
57. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 649-58. 
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[The] Defendant is being tried under well settled Constitutional principles, 
[therefore] Defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. To 
hold otherwise would be to deprive a defendant of his right to a jury trial 
and allow for a judge to preliminarily convict a defendant of the crime on 
which he was charged. This Court is unwilling to extend [forfeiture] to al­
low in the testimony of a decedent victim for whose death a defendant is 
on trial.58 
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While there is some appeal to this argument, it is ultimately unconvinc­
ing. The judge, in making a finding of forfeiture, is not declaring a 
defendant guilty but merely finding that there is sufficient evidence to admit 
the contested testimony to the jury. 59 The jury still must find a defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before any punishment can be imposed. In 
short, "[t]he judge has her job and the ju� has its own, and they perform 
them in a substantially different manner." The judge's inquiry is merely 
evidentiary, reserving for the jury any judgment that the defendant's actions 
were criminal. Judges are frequently called upon to make preliminary find­
ings that are identical to jury issues. For example, a majority of states do not 
require a grand jury to issue an indictment in felony cases.6 1  They allow 
judges to make preliminary determinations of probable cause to believe a 
defendant committed the very crime for which she will later stand trial. 62 
The Supreme Court also has approved of a trial court's predicate finding that 
a conspiracy existed even when one of the underlying crimes before the jury 
was the existence of the same conspiracy.6 3  In light of these common prac­
tices, there is no merit to the objection that courts should not determine 
preliminary matters that are identical to the ultimate issues that a jury will 
confront. 
That courts rarely voice a concern with forfeiture's reflexive application 
when witness tampering is involved provides strong evidence that when 
courts do object they are doing so, not because reflexive application is in­
herently objectionable, but for different reasons. Addressing Question 3 will 
help reveal those reasons. 
3. A Broader Application of Reflexive Forfeiture 
Courts have been extremely reluctant to answer Question 3 in the af­
firmative because, I argue, the evidence of forfeiture's occurrence is usually 
relatively weak. That is, there is no conceptual reason to reject forfeiture in 
a case like this-as courts often argue-it is just that there usually is not 
strong evidence that forfeiture actually occurred. 
58. United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
59. See Friedman, Chutl[)a, supra note 8, at 522-23. 
60. See FRIEDMAN, EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 269-70. 
61. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 14.2(d) (2d ed. 1992). 
62. See id. 
63. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
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Question 3 asks whether V1's statement, "D shot me," can be admitted 
against D in his trial for murdering V1 based on a forfeiture finding. Forfei­
ture had never been applied in this manner before Crawford.64 However, in 
the brief time since Crawford was decided, a number of courts have recon­
sidered this application of forfeiture, a small majority have endorsed it,65 and 
the California Supreme Court has taken it under review.66 In the case most 
similar to the one posed in Question 3, a police officer responded to a report 
that a shooting had occurred and found James Green wounded and laying in 
the street. 67 The officer asked Green who shot him, and Green responded, 
"Meeks shot me." Less than two hours later, before he could be questioned 
68 any further on the matter, Green was pronounced dead. The court held that 
forfeiture applied in this situation and approved of the statement's admission 
against Meeks at his trial for Green's murder. This third case differs from 
the first two insofar as the victim did not witness any prior crime, and forfei­
ture is being applied on the sole ground that the defendant wrongly caused 
his victim's unavailability. 
The only objections courts make to applying forfeiture in this third type 
of case are unpersuasive. Courts have made one of two---or both­
objections to applying forfeiture under these circumstances: (1) forfeiture 
does not apply because the defendant's motive was not to make the witness 
unavailable,69 and (2) it does not apply because it would be improper to ap­
ply the rule reflexively.7 0  But, as I have argued, both of these objections are 
64. See Flanagan, supra note 9, at 483 (surveying opinions, and noting that none of them 
stood for "the broader principle that responsibility for the witness's absence . . .  would be a waiver 
of constitutional and evidentiary rights.") However, I disagree with Flanagan's description that the 
cases all require a specific intent to prevent a witness from testifying at trial, since the courts often 
gloss over or skip the intent inquiry entirely. See, e.g., United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 
(8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an argument that forfeiture requires this specific intent, countering that "it 
establishes the general proposition that a defendant may not benefit from his or her wrongful pre­
vention of future testimony from a witness or potential witness."). 
65. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (listing the post-Crawford cases to con­
sider the issue and grouping them based on how each has come down on the matter). 
66. People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 
Dec. 22, 2004). 
67. State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 792 (Kan. 2004). 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *5 (D. 
Colo. Mar. 3, 2005) ("The Doctrine as codified applies [only] to actions whose purpose is to prevent 
the testimony."); Wyatt v. State, 981 P.2d 109, 115 n.11 (Alaska 1999) ("The cases espousing this 
rule all involve a defendant who has intentionally acted to silence an individual in order to prevent 
the witness from testifying . . .  "); People v. Maher, 654 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1007 (1997) ("[The] excep­
tion cannot be invoked where, as in the instant case, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the 
defendant's acts against the absent witness were motivated, even in part, by a desire to prevent the 
victim from testifying against him in court."); Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1062 n. 4 
(Pa. 2001) (holding that forfeiture "only applies when a party's wrongdoing is done with the inten­
tion of making the declarant unavailable to testify as a witness."). 
70. See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426 (E.D. Va. 2002) (refusing to 
apply forfeiture reflexively because it would "deprive a defendant of his right to a jury trial and 
allow for a judge to preliminarily convict a defendant of the crime on which he was charged"); State 
v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245, 1253 (Conn. 1987) (refusing to apply forfeiture because, "although the 
threats made by the defendant against the minor victim were . . .  designed to conceal his wrongdo-
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foreclosed. Preoccupation with a defendant's motives in these cases ignores 
the equitable underpinnings of forfeiture, 71 and courts frequently decide is­
sues that are identical to the questions a jury must face. 7
2 
Not only are these 
two objections unpersuasive, but they are almost uniformly rejected when­
ever a case involving witness tampering arises.7 3  
Why are courts, in answering Question 3 in the negative, relying on two 
justifications that are transparently weak and typically rejected in answering 
Questions 1 and 2 in the affirmative? The answer is that this third type of 
case is fairly common and the evidence that the defendant did commit the 
wrongdoing at hand is typically weaker because of the underlying circum­
stances. While there is no principled objection to forfeiture's reflexive 
application, there is an evidentiary explanation for why courts have been 
reluctant to accept it. 
B. An Evidentiary Explanation for the Discrepancies 
In the third type of case there is usually less convincing evidence that 
forfeiture actually occurred, and that provides the best explanation for the 
above discrepancies in forfeiture's application. The hypothetical situation 
we have been considering illustrates this point . Remember that, as previ­
ously explained, we can expect that both of V2's statements will be admitted 
based on a finding of forfeiture, whereas the admissibility of V,'s statement 
is more questionable. The reason for this discrepancy has nothing to do with 
concerns about the defendant's motives or reflexive application of forfeiture. 
It is simply that we have significantly better evidence suggesting that D ac­
tually killed V r This may be a surprising statement, as the hypothetical was 
sketched so thinly that it is no doubt difficult to detect the disparity in the 
amount of evidence. In fact, the opposite appears to be true, since V 1 's 
statement, "D shot me," looks to be more probative of what it asserts than 
V/s speculative statement, "D threatened to kill me if I cooperate with the 
police." 
But even the thinly sketched circumstances we have provide much 
stronger evidence that D actually killed V2: V/s statement, while unambigu­
ous and nonspeculative, has absolutely nothing to corroborate D's identity 
as the killer. To find that D actually killed V" a judge would have to rely 
entirely on V/s assertion of that fact. This is especially problematic after 
Crawford, which teaches that the Confrontation Clause will not allow judges 
to accept such testimonial statements at face value if they have not been 
ing, they were made during the commission of the very crimes with which he is charged"); Maher, 
654 N.Y.S. 2d at 1007 (finding forfeiture's application "is even more anomalous where, as here, it is 
invoked against a defendant in the very trial in which the charge is murder of the unavailable wit­
ness "). 
71. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra Part Il.A.2. 
73. See supra Parts II.A.I, 11.A.2. 
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confronted.7 4  Conversely, in addition to V/s speculative statement implicat­
ing D, there is strong corroborating evidence that D killed Yr D was on 
trial, V2 was a key witness against D in that trial, and just before V2 was to 
testify she was murdered. I suspect that most people confronted with these 
circumstances would preliminarily conclude that D killed V 2, or was at least 
involved in the murder, even had V2 never made the speculative accusation. 
To be clear, I am not claiming that these circumstances alone are enough to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt--or under any other standard of proof-that 
D murdered V2• The claim is only that they are highly probative of that fact, 
and there is no similar corroborating evidence to suggest that D killed V 1 •  
Strong evidence such as this will typically exist t o  support a forfeiture 
finding in witness-tampering cases by the very nature of the circumstances 
that underlie them. One court, faced with a standard witness-tampering case, 
was not at all concerned about the lack of any material evidence. In that 
case, a defendant stood trial for various drug offenses, and the principal wit­
ness against him was killed on his way to the courthouse to testify. In 
holding that the defendant was probably responsible for the witness's death, 
Judge Jack B. Weinstein did not see the need to dig too deeply: 
I was warranted in finding that this defendant . . .  either directly arranged 
for the killing of the witness or was advised of the possible killing of the 
witness and acquiesced. He was the only person that could gain from it 
. . . .  It just is inconceivable . . .  that this radical step to aid Mastrangelo, 
who is the only person that could have been helped by killing this witness, 
would have been taken without his knowledge, acquiescence, or orders.75 
That a witness was at one point willing to testify against a defendant, but 
suddenly became unavailable, just happens to be strong evidence that the 
defendant took some intermediate action to procure the witness's unavail­
ability. 
The reason why courts repeatedly offer the two deficient objections re­
garding a defendant's motives and forfeiture's reflexive application when 
confronted with the third type of case-instead of simply declaring that 
there is insufficient evidence to make a forfeiture finding-is tough to de­
termine. The best explanation is that there may be sufficient evidence in a 
particular case, but courts are worried about extending forfeiture outside of 
the classic witness-intimidation realm because of broader implications for 
how the rule is applied. I do not claim they are conscious of this behavior, 
merely that they are often unwilling to give due consideration to arguments 
in favor of expanding forfeiture because it is easiest to keep it limited to a 
74. In overturning what had been the prevailing framework for more than two decades, the 
Court described the flaws in that framework as "allow[ing] a jury to hear evidence, untested by the 
adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability . . . . thus replac[ing] the 
constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one." Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004 ). The difficulties with such a finding are discussed further in 
terms of bootstrapping evidence, infra Part ill.B.2. 
75. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1<?32) (quoting Judge 
Weinstein's trial findings). Judge Weinstein also noted the "neutral" demeanor of the defendant 
upon hearing the announcement that the witness had been killed. Id. 
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circumscribed set of facts. There is evidence of this concern in several 
cases.76 These courts are not objecting to forfeiture's reflexive application on 
any principled basis, but only on the grounds that the rule should be applied 
narrowly and only in cases where the evidence of forfeiture is rather strong. 
Limiting the rule's application to witness-tampering cases achieves both 
these goals. They are relatively rare and will inherently have a fairly strong 
evidentiary basis for a forfeiture finding, as explained above. However, it 
should not be too difficult to fashion coherent rules that would achieve these 
goals more effectively and consistently. 
III. How EXPANSIVE FORFEITURE CouLD BECOME AND SOME PROPOSED 
LIMITATIONS 
Expanding forfeiture beyond witness-tampering cases leaves us with a 
much simpler equitable doctrine. While the sentiment that forfeiture should 
apply infrequently and only when there is strong evidence of its occurrence 
is a good one, it would be better realized with limitations that are designed 
to consistently achieve that end. Part III.A offers a further exploration of the 
equitable doctrine of forfeiture envisioned here, and in Part IIl.B I off er two 
proposed limitations. The two I offer-regarding a narrow interpretation of 
unavailability and a bar on testimonial bootstrapping-are merely first at­
tempts at fashioning coherent limiting principles. 
A. The New Approach to Foifeiture and Its Implications 
Doing away with the formal constraints that pervaded forfeiture's appli­
cation before Crawford leaves us with a much simpler equitable doctrine. 
Under the forfeiture doctrine envisioned here, a defendant should not prevail 
on a Confrontation Clause objection if her wrongful conduct caused the in­
ability to cross-examine a witness. The Sixth Circuit recently endorsed a 
very similar view, indicating that under the doctrine a "defendant may not 
sustain a Confrontation Clause objection if the defendant is responsible for 
the declarant's unavailability at trial."77 
There are two caveats to that articulation that should be recognized. 
First, forfeiture should apply only when the defendant's conduct is wrong­
ful. A defendant who claims a privilege to keep a spouse from testifying, for 
76. See United States v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 51350 1 at *6 (D. Colo. 
Mar. 3, 2005) (rejecting application of the rule as it could lead to its application "broadly . . .  in any 
murder case."); State v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1 245, 1253 (Conn. 1987) ("The constitutional right of 
confrontation would have little force, however, if we were to find an implied waiver of that right in 
every instance where the accused, in order to silence his victim, uttered threats during the commis­
sion of the crime for which he is on trial."); People v. Maher, 654 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1007 (1997 
(rejecting reflexive application of the rule in part because it would "swallow up the narrowly drawn 
traditional dying declaration hearsay exception"). 
77. United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 916 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., dissenting). While 
the Arnold majority did not consider the forfeiture issue, since it was not briefed, this statement 
merely reflects what the Sixth Circuit found in United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
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instance, could be said to have caused the witness 's unavailability, 7 8  but not 
in a way inconsistent with maintaining the right to confrontation. Indeed, 
Crawford would have had a different outcome had the Court envisioned for­
feiture as applying to rightful conduct that caused a witness's 
unavailability. 7 9  
Second, even where a defendant does not directly cause a witness's un­
availability, forfeiture may still apply if the defendant's wrongful conduct 
caused his inability to cross-examine the witness. For instance, if a defen­
dant remains a fugitive until all witnesses against him die of natural causes, 
although he certainly did not cause the witnesses' deaths, forfeiture should 
still apply because he caused his inability to cross-examine them. Two re­
cent cases involved a defendant who absconded, remained a fugitive for a 
number of years, and by the time he was captured a crucial witness against 
him died or was deported.8 0  While both courts-adhering to unduly rigid 
definitions of what it means to cause a witness's unavailability without 
much analysis-found that forfeiture did not apply under these circum­
stances, that result is unjustified. While it is a stretch to say the defendants 
caused the witnesses' unavailability-since neither was involved with the 
death or deportation of the witnesses-we can say that their wrongful con­
duct caused their inability to cross examine the witnesses. It seems clear that 
causing one's own inability to cross-examine is what lies at the heart of the 
forfeiture rule. One foreseeable consequence of absconding for a prolonged 
period of time is that the witnesses you would want to confront may not be 
available when you are eventually brought to trial. That should be enough to 
dismiss any objection the defendants might raise under the Confrontation 
Clause with regard to the absent witnesses. 
This reconceived rule of forfeiture has the unfortunate potential to put a 
substantial dent in the confrontation right. One commentator noted that it 
"could lead to the unavailability of confrontation in entire categories of 
cases." 8 1  While that is a mischaracterization-as forfeiture applies only to 
particular witnesses and never to cases entirely-it would be accurate to say 
that forfeiture threatens to eliminate a defendant's right to confront the vic­
tim in entire categories of prosecutions. The most obvious category is 
homicide prosecutions. If the applicable standard of proof for finding forfei-
78. Cf Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 n.1 (1999) (plurality opinion) (assuming that the 
valid invocation of a Fifth Amendment privilege establishes unavailability). 
79. It was Sylvia Crawford's out-of-court testimony implicating her husband that was at 
issue in the case. It is fair to say that Michael Crawford caused her unavailability at trial, since he 
refused to waive his spousal privilege. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 ("Sylvia did not testify because 
of the state marital privilege, which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other 
spouse's consent.") (citation omitted). 
80. See People v. Melchor, No. 1-03-3036, 2005 WL 1522715 (Ill. App. Ct. June 28, 2005) 
(witness died); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004) (witness was deported). 
81. Andrew C. Fine, a criminal defense lawyer, posted this comment on 
The Confrontation Blog, at http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2004/12/forfeiture-and-dying­
declarations.html#comments (no date provided) (last visited July 24, 2005). The comment was in 
response to the "Forfeiture and Dying Declarations" post and was made at 5:35 p.m. 
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ture is a preponderance o f  the evidence-as most courts have held 8
2 
-then 
forfeiture will almost always bar a homicide defendant's Confrontation 
Clause objections to the admission of the victim's testimony. Without a pre­
ponderance of the evidence suggesting that the defendant killed the victim 
and thereby made her unavailable, the evidence is likely insufficient to try 
the defendant for homicide in the first place. 8 3  Likewise, prosecutors can 
make colorable arguments that forfeiture should apply whenever a defen­
dant's crime could be said to have scared or intimidated the victim from 
testifying at trial. 84 This will be especially applicable in cases involving do­
mestic abuse, sexual assault or any other "naturally intimidating offense" 
that might have the effect of keeping a victim from testifying.85 
The prospect of a severely diminished confrontation right in these 
prosecutions where confrontation is most vital--due to the severity of the 
punishments and the heavy reliance on victim testimon/6-is not an en­
tirely welcome one. We should therefore hope to discover some principled 
limitations on the rule. 
82. See supra note 43; see also State v. Hale, 691 N.W. 2d 637, 653 (Wis. 2005) (Prosser, J., 
concurring) (surveying cases that apply the preponderance standard). 
83. See Fine, supra note 8 1 :  
When the ultimate issue is involved, a judge will almost always have found, before trial, that 
the prosecution's evidence establishes defendant's guilt by a preponderance of the evidence, 
either by finding probable cause to hold the defendant after a preliminary hearing, or by 
finding the evidence presented to a grand jury to be legally sufficient. 
But see United States v. Miller, 1 16 F.3d 64 1 ,  669 (2d Cir. 1 997), where the court drew a somewhat 
plausible distinction: 
A grand jury's indictment is based on probable cause, not on a preponderance of the evidence, 
and that body makes its judgment after an ex pane proceeding at which the target of its inquiry 
is normally not permitted to call or cross-examine witnesses. The grand jury's conclusion, after 
such a proceeding, that there is probable cause to indict a defendant for murder is not an ac­
ceptable surrogate for a court's finding, after a hearing at which both sides have the 
opportunity to be heard, that the defendant's responsibility for that murder is established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
84. For a further discussion of these issues, see Friedman, Chutl/}a, supra note 8, at 527-35 
(discussing the implications of this rule for severely battered victims and child victims of sexual 
abuse). 
85. See Chris Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Coun Re-Vamps Two Dec­
ades of Confrontation Clause Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 4 1 ,  71 (2005) 
(pointing out that in these cases, "[t]he all-too-frequent recantations and refusals to testify [may be 
attributable] to the defendant's wrongdoing"); Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington 
"Forfeiture by Wrongdoing " Confrontation Clause Exception in Child Abuse Cases, REASONABLE 
EFFORTS, Vol. 1 ,  Num. 3 (2004), available at http://www.ndaa-apri .org/publications/ 
newsletters/reasonable_efforts_volume_l_number_3_2004.html ("If the accused's acts are respon­
sible for the child being in a condition where the child refuses to testify, states she cannot remember, 
or becomes non-responsive, the requirement of unavailability should be considered to be met.") 
(citations omitted); Krischer, supra note 37, at 1 5- 1 6  ("Domestic violence is not an event, but ongo­
ing, systematic abuse. Prosecutors must educate their judges that the domestic violence itself may 
have procured the victim's unavailability."). 
86. See Neal A. Hudders, Note, The Problem of Using Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases: 
ls a New Exception the Answer?, 49 DUKE L. J. 1 04 1 ,  1 060-6 1 (2000) (noting that domestic abuse 
usually takes place in private with few witnesses, such that "the prosecution of domestic violence 
cases can only be effective if the . . .  statements of the victim are admissible at trial"). 
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B. Two Suggested Limitations 
Limitations on the rule of forfeiture clearly should not be eliminated en­
tirely; they should just be recalibrated. As discussed earlier, what had 
motivated courts to restrict forfeiture to witness-tampering cases was the 
sentiment that forfeiture should apply ( 1) infrequently and (2) only upon a 
showing of strong evidence of its occurrence.8 7  While the sentiment has 
merit, it should be realized in a more principled way than confining forfei­
ture to witness-tampering cases. Two limitations that could achieve the 
above goals are to apply forfeiture (1) only upon a showing that the witness 
is "genuinely unavailable," which occurs infrequently, and (2) only when 
there is substantial evidence independent of the unconfronted testimonial 
statement at issue that forfeiture occurred, which requires strong evidence. 
This second proposed limitation is essentially a call to revive the rule 
against bootstrapping when testimonial statements are at issue. 8 8  The argu­
ment is not that these limitations are constitutionally required-although 
that ultimately may be true. My more humble suggestion is that recognizing 
these limitations would allay the legitimate concerns of judges and com­
mentators who are worried about the frequency and evidentiary strength of 
forfeiture findings, and would do so in a more principled way than limiting 
forfeiture to witness-intimidation cases. 
1. A Narrow Interpretation of Unavailability 
Requiring that a witness be unavailable in a strict sense would help con­
fine forfeiture to relatively few cases. There is no question that homicide 
victims are unavailable for cross-examination, but determining unavailabil­
ity in domestic and sexual abuse cases is a more difficult task. Studies on the 
willingness of domestic abuse victims to testify against their abusers indi­
cate that up to eighty percent of them seek to dismiss charges against their 
abusers, 89 while as few as four percent are actively willing to testify. 90 As the 
Second Circuit put it, a witness who is "so fearful that he will not testify or 
will testify falsely is just as unavailable as a witness who is dead or cannot 
be found." 91 Since domestic abuse is an intimidating offense, victims of 
which are typically unwilling to testify, one could mistakenly conclude that 
in nearly every domestic violence case, the defendant has forfeited his right 
87. See supra Part 11.B. 
88. I use the word "revive" because the rule against bootstrapping had been accepted for 
decades until 1 987, when Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, all but obliterated it. See infm 
Part ill.B.2. 
89. David M. Gersten, Evidentiary Trends in Domestic Violence, 72 FLA. B.J. 65, 67 n.3 
(1998) (indicating that fifty to eighty percent of victims seek to dismiss the charges). 
90. Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effec­
tive Prosecution Stmtegies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 1 5  
HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 1 3 9  n.108 (1991). For a discussion o f  this issue that speaks o f  the trend more 
broadly than Asmus's targeted study, see generally EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (3d ed. 2003). 
91. Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation omitted). 
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to confront the victim. In the wake of Crawford, this has prompted one at­
torney to brazenly declare, "[d]omestic violence almost always involves 
forfeiture." 9
2 
It would be a mistake to extend forfeiture to cases in which the witness 
may genuinely be available to testify, as Crawford evinces a preference for 
in-court testimony and cross-examination whenever possible. The Supreme 
Court has noted that complying with a forum's evidence rules with regard to 
unavailability may not satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns, 93 but exactly 
what is required is unclear. It might be that the Confrontation Clause re­
quires only a "good faith" effort by a prosecutor to obtain a witness's live 
testimony, 94 but such a malleable standard is hardly illuminating. 
What constitutes "genuine unavailability" is a tough question, but at the 
very least it should mean that the witness refuses to testify even when faced 
with a court order, as the Federal Rules require.95 It should not extend to 
cases where the witness is willing to take the stand but will explicitly recant 
any prior accusations.96 In those circumstances, the prosecutor will typically 
have the opportunity to impeach the witness with prior testimony and let the 
jury draw whatever conclusions it will. Given what is at stake, an argument 
could be made that the witness must be physically incapable of testifying 
before being considered unavailable in this context, but that is probably too 
harsh a limitation. There is some thoughtful scholarship on the question of 
when a witness should be considered unavailable, 9 7  although it is not exactly 
clear how Crawford will impact such analysis.9 8  It is enough to say that, in 
this context, unavailability should be defined in a way that will require 
prosecutors to exhaust all reasonable means to obtain live testimony. 9 9  
92. Krischer, supra note 37, at 14. 
93. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
94. Id. at 724-25. While this standard has garnered some consensus, it really only begs sev­
eral other questions regarding what constitutes a good faith effort in light of the protections of the 
Sixth Amendment. 
95. See FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(2). 
96. But see Geraci, 211 F.3d at 7-9 (affirming the application of forfeiture where the witness 
was willing to take the stand, but would only recant his prior account of the event at issue). 
97. See, e.g. , Richard D. Friedman, Remote Testimony, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 695, 708-
11 (2002); Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the Contours of Unavailability and Reliability for the 
Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 189 (1993). 
98. See Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 
589-90 (2004 ). Jeffrey L. Fisher also notes in his outline of post-Crawford cases, with regard to 
unavailability, "Crawford does not appear to change this law, but it makes it much more important." 
Crawford v. Washington: Reframing the Right to Confrontation, http://www.dwt.com/lawdir/ 
publications/CrawfordOutline.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). 
99. This tracks some language in the Federal Rules of Evidence, stating that unavailability 
applies when the proponent of a declaration could not produce the declarant "by process or other 
reasonable means." FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(5). The suggestion here is simply that we should require a 
fairly high bar for what constitutes "reasonable means." Given the difficulty with making that as­
sessment, the rule should likely intrude into instances where a prosecutor did make all reasonable 
attempts to obtain a witness but failed. That is, the rule will probably have to be overly broad (e.g., 
requiring that a witness be physically incapable of testifying) in order to provide prosecutors with fit 
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The exact parameters of this limitation are not of too much concern 
here, though, as it is enough to notice that the limitation-whatever form it 
may take-is far more principled than limiting forfeiture to witness­
intimidation cases. This limitation is based on the preference for in-court 
testimony and on keeping overzealous prosecutors from bypassing that pref­
erence by arguing forfeiture in every case. It provides clear incentives for 
prosecutors to do everything in their power to produce their witnesses at 
trial, in accordance with the principles underlying the Confrontation Clause. 
It does not draw unworkable distinctions between witness intimidation and 
other types of cases. 
2. A Rule against the Bootstrapping of Testimony 
The second proposed limitation is that, in making a predicate finding of 
forfeiture, a court should place minimal reliance on the unconfronted testi­
monial evidence at issue. At the very . least, a court should not make a 
forfeiture finding based solely on unconfronted testimony. The practice of 
considering a contested statement as evidence of its own admissibility is 
known as bootstrapping.100 For a time, bootstrapping was uniformly prohib­
ited. 101 But following Bourjailf v. United States in 1987, it was essentially 
an unobjectionable practice.10 In that case, the Supreme Court explicitly 
permitted trial courts to engage in bootstrapping when co-conspirator state­
ments, are at issue. 103 That is, a court is allowed to consider an alleged co­
conspirator' s statement as evidence that a conspiracy did exist, and thereby 
admit the same statement at trial based on the co-conspirator exception to 
the rule against hearsay. 104 After recognizing that its prior holdings coun­
seled against bootstrapping, the court found that those holdings were 
incentives for obtaining witnesses. While I do regret that I do not have a firmer or better developed 
opinion on the matter, I hope it is contribution enough to raise the issue in this context. 
100. The term refers to a piece of evidence "lift[ing) itself by its own bootstraps to the level of 
competent evidence." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942). For instance, when a wit­
ness's unconfronted testimony is, "D is the one who fatally injured me," and a defendant objects that 
it should not be admitted because it violates the Confrontation Clause, a judge who considers that 
statement as evidence that the defendant forfeited his confrontation right has bootstrapped the evi­
dence insofar as she has allowed it to provide the basis for its own admissibility. See generally 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
Sometimes the practice of a judge deciding, as a preliminary matter, the same issue that will be 
decided at trial is referred to as bootstrapping. This is not how I use the term here, as I have no ob­
jection to that practice. See supra notes 58--03 and accompanying text. 
101. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 74-75; see also Patrick J. Sullivan, Note, Bootstrapping of 
Hearsay Under Federal Rule of Evidence 80J(d)(2)(E): Funher Erosion of the Coconspirator Ex­
emption, 74 IOWA L. REV. 467, 482-83 nn.96-101 (1989). 
102. See 483 U.S. at 180-81. 
103. Id. at 180 ("We think that there is little doubt that a co-conspirator's statements could 
themselves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of both the defendant 
and the declarant in the conspiracy."). 
104. See FED. R. Evm. 80l (d)(2)(E). To be more precise, the Federal Rules hold that state­
ments made by co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy are not excepted from the rule against 
hearsay-as exceptions can be found in Rules 803 and 804--but are not hearsay at all. 
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superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 1 05 However, Crawford rejects 
the position that the Federal Rules dictate the constitutional content of the 
Confrontation Clause, and thereby calls Bourjaily into question. 106 While 
bootstrapping is clearly allowed when ordinary hearsay is concerned, Craw­
ford's new framework raises some serious doubts as to its permissibility 
when testimonial statements are involved.1 07 
Crawford explicitly abrogated a process where testimonial statements 
were admitted "based on a mere judicial determination of reliability." 1 08 In­
deed, the Court endorsed the rule of forfeiture on the basis that "it does not 
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability." 109 However, 
when a judge relies on a testimonial statement as evidence of its own truth 
in making a forfeiture finding, it would be an obvious fiction to say that for­
feiture does not purport to be a means of determining reliability. 
Revisiting our Question 3, a judge faced with that scenario could find 
forfeiture only if she found that V , 's statement, "D shot me," was wholly 
reliable. Recall that the issue is whether V 1 's statement can be used against 
D in his trial for shooting V,.  Furthermore, let us assume that this is the only 
significant evidence that implicates D in V , 's murder.1 1 0  While Part II oper­
ated on the assumption that there was sufficient evidence for a judge to find 
forfeiture, the issue posed here is what evidence the judge should consider 
when making the finding. If a judge relied on the unconfronted statement to 
make a finding of forfeiture, it would be the functional equivalent of admit­
ting testimony based on a judicial determination of its reliability, as 
expressly prohibited in Crawford." '  Therefore, it would be tough to square 
Crawford with unfettered bootstrapping in cases like this. 
Unfortunately, my analysis here is doomed to circular reasoning. If our 
hypothetical defendant complained to a judge about this form of bootstrap­
ping, the conversation would probably develop as follows: 
D: You should not consider V, 's testimony when determining forfeiture, as I 
have not had the chance to confront him about it. 
Judge: But that is your own fault, as you caused V, 's unavailability by kill­
ing him, so you cannot now complain of your inability to confront him. 
105. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180-83. 
106. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("[W]e do not think the Framers meant 
to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . . .  "). 
107. Co-conspirator statements will almost categorically not be testimonial. It would be very 
difficult for a statement to be made in furtherance of a conspiracy and in anticipation that it will be 
used at trial. While I have not argued for any particular view of what constitutes a testimonial state­
ment, it seems fairly certain that co-conspirators acting in furtherance of their plot are not bearing 
witness. This was discussed at some length during the oral arguments in Crawford. Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 14-16, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-94 10). 
108. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
109. Id. 
1 10. Of course, there will always be some other evidence. For instance, that V, even knew D's 
name will count as some corroborating evidence, it is just not very significant. 
1 1 1 . See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 6 1-62. 
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D: There is no evidence that I killed VJ other than his testimony, which is 
precisely what I have a right to confront. I cannot be deprived of my 
right to confront him based on the very statement that is constitutionally 
inadmissible. 
Judge: But forfeiture provides an exception to your confrontation right, and 
having found that the exception applies here, you cannot complain 
about my consideration of the testimonial statement. 
D: You only made that finding based on the very statement that I should 
have had a right to confront ! 
The debate has reached an impasse, as both the judge and the defendant 
are arguing in circles. 
In light of how critical confronting adverse witnesses is to a fair trial­
and given Crawford's affirmation of that right when testimony is con­
cerned-the circle must be broken in favor of the defendant. That is the only 
way to give the Confrontation Clause meaning in these contexts. If VJ 's 
statement, "D shot me," can furnish the basis of its own admissibility and 
then be used to convict the defendant, the confrontation right would become 
empty in these situations. An unconfronted accusation could be enough to 
convict a defendant, and the Confrontation Clause clearly counsels against 
that outcome. The better rule after Crawford is that an unconfronted testi­
monial statement cannot furnish the basis for a forfeiture finding absent 
"substantial independent evidence." That is, substantial evidence other than 
the contested testimonial statement. 
While a fair conclusion from the above discussion is that the judge 
should be absolutely prohibited from considering unconfronted testimony in 
making forfeiture findings, such a bright line is unnecessary. A "substantial 
independent evidence" test is better than an absolute prohibition on boot­
strapping for two, largely pragmatic reasons. 1 1 2 First, given how difficult it is 
for judges to discount evidence entirely, it will usually be inaccurate to de­
scribe a judge as giving no weight to evidence that she is aware of if it is 
largely on point. It would be better if the rule recognized this fact and sim­
ply required that the judge's finding be based substantially on independent 
evidence-evidence independently sufficient for a forfeiture finding-to 
circumvent concerns that judges should not even be exposed to evidence 
they are prohibited from considering. Second, this rule will also make the 
job of reviewing courts easier while remaining consistent with the concerns 
expressed here. Rather than asking reviewing courts to probe the record for 
evidence that a trial j udge considered prohibited evidence when finding for­
feiture, it would be easier to ask if the independent evidence was 
1 1 2. Of course, what this amounts to is that a judge can bootstrap only in those situations 
where bootstrapping would be ostensibly unnecessary. It is like responding to a thirsty man's cries 
for water by saying, "I would gladly give you a glass of water if only you were not so thirsty." But, 
for reasons considered infra, it does not mean that the distinction between this "substantial inde­
pendent evidence" test and an absolute prohibition on bootstrapping is meaningless. 
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sufficient. 1 13 These two considerations are not the most compelling and per­
haps there are overriding reasons to prefer an absolute prohibition on 
bootstrapping testimony. But, again, the goal here is not to sketch any par­
ticularly robust limiting principles; it is to show there are principled w ays of 
constraining forfeiture to meet the concerns that courts have displayed. 
What is problematic is depriving the confrontation right of any real 
meaning by allowing testimonial statements to lift themselves into admissi­
bility. This concern is dispelled so long as they are not given significant 
weight and are supported by substantial evidence. For instance, recall the 
Meeks case described above, 114 in which the victim's unconfronted state­
ment, "Meeks shot me," was used against the defendant on the basis of a 
forfeiture finding. In addition to that statement, the trial court heard four 
witnesses who watched the fight between Meeks and Green, all of whom 
heard gunshots and saw Meeks standing over Green directly thereafter. 1 15 
With this independent evidence, a judge could disregard the testimonial 
statement and still find that forfeiture occurred. In cases like this, bootstrap­
ping would not run afoul of Crawford, as the independent evidence makes 
the forfeiture finding noticeably different from a mere judicial proclamation 
that the statements are reliable. 
While Bourjaily held that the Federal Rules of Evidence abrogated the 
rule against bootstrapping with regard to ordinary hearsay, now that the dis­
tinction between testimony and hearsay is recognized, a "substantial 
independent evidence" test should be applied when testimonial statements 
are at issue. Interestingly, a rule similar to the one proposed here prevailed 
before Bourjaily . 1 16 In United States v. Nixon, addressing the bootstrapping 
problem with regard to co-conspirator statements, the Court stated, "As a 
preliminary matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence of the 
conspiracy, at least enough to take the question to the jury."1 17 Only with this 
requirement in place could a finding of forfeiture be meaningfully different 
from a mere determination of the reliability of unconfronted testimony. 
One might respond that confrontation is a trial right1 18-not extended to 
pretrial proceedings-making this argument unorthodox, as it contemplates 
a Confrontation Clause violation where the judge considers unconfronted 
testimony at a preliminary hearing. But the pretrial right envisioned here is 
essential to giving the confrontation right meaning at trial. It is limited to the 
rare occasion when the pretrial question requires determining the reliability 
of a testimonial statement, and the result of the finding is to admit the same 
1 13. Perhaps this goal could also be achieved by limiting reviewing courts to a more restricted 
review, such as a harmless error analysis. 
1 14. State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004); see supra notes 70-7 1 and accompanying text. 
1 15. Id. at 794-95. 
1 16. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171  (1987). 
1 17. 418 U.S. 683, 702 n. 1 4  ( 1974). 
1 1 8. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1987) (noting that the Confrontation 
Clause does not force the government to provide the accused with confrontation at pretrial proceed­
ings). 
624 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:599 
unconfronted testimony into evidence at trial. Without this pretrial confron­
tation right, the trial right would be too easily circumvented, as an 
unconfronted statement could lift itself into admissibility based on a forfei­
ture finding , thereby bypassing confrontation safeguards altogether. 1 19 
While this argument has probably raised more questions than it has an­
swered, the goal here is only to define some principled means of limiting 
forfeiture findings to cases where strong evidence exists. 1 2 0 This proposed 
rule against bootstrapping addresses the unfairness of using evidence that 
has not yet been shown to be trustworthy through the constitutionally pre­
scribed method of confrontation against a defendant. Similarly, requiring 
that a witness be genuinely unavailable helps realize the preference for in­
court testimony whenever possible. With these two limitations in place , 
courts could rest assured that forfeiture will not swallow up the Confronta­
tion Clause, as it would apply only in rare cases and upon a showing of 
substantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
My conclusions conflict somewhat with regard to just how expansively 
forfeiture should apply. If equity is the guiding concern, as Crawford indi­
cates, then forfeiture should preclude a Confrontation Clause objection 
whenever a defendant's wrongful conduct causes a witness's unavailability. 
This should increase forfeiture's importance in more run-of-the-mill crimi­
nal cases, including homicide and domestic abuse cases where an 
unavailable victim gave prior testimony. While limiting the rule to witness­
tampering cases is unjustifiable, I share the worry with many courts · that 
expanding forfeiture further could result in an impoverished confrontation 
right. But the answer cannot be to stand by an indefensible distinction be­
tween witness intimidation and other types of cases. Instead, breaking down 
the cases that address forfeiture reveals that the meaningful objections to 
expanding forfeiture are directed at the breadth of the exception and its evi­
dentiary support. 
Taking these objections to heart, we might begin to formulate more 
principled limitations to the rule of forfeiture. I believe the two limitations 
proposed here-focused on declarant unavailability and testimonial boot­
strapping-would help alleviate the concerns about forfeiture swallowing up 
the confrontation right. They directly address the frequency and evidentiary 
strength of forfeiture findings and can be derived from the themes underly-
1 19. After Crawford, it is worth revisiting other circumstances where a pretrial right of con­
frontation might exist. The topic is one that I have not thought enough about to offer any views 
beyond the narrow ones already given. 
1 20. Perhaps a more straightforward way of achieving this would be to require a higher stan­
dard of proof for forfeiture findings. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. Unit B 
1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence); People v. Maher, 654 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1007 (1997) 
("Because of the weighty countervailing interests, that is, the constitutional right of confrontation 
. . .  we imposed a clear and convincing evidentiary standard of proof for the establishment of the 
factual basis for admitting out-of-court statements of a declarant whose unavailability was caused by 
the defendant."). 
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ing Crawford and the Confrontation Clause. Nonetheless, they are only first 
attempts at addressing concerns that accompany an expansive rule of forfei­
ture. There are certainly other limitations that might have the same desired 
effect. Recognizing that limiting forfeiture to witness-tampering cases is 
unprincipled, and that there are alternative methods to addressing concerns 
about forfeiture's expansiveness, is just the first step in revamping the equi­
table doctrine. Crawford has provided the occasion to do just that. 
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